It has been frequently noted that in a non-regulated environment the development of public transport service is self-adjusting: Faced with decreasing demand, operators will tend to reduce service to cut costs, resulting in a decrease in the level-of-service, which then triggers a further drop in demand. The opposite may also occur: high demand will induce the operator to increase supply, e.g. through an increase in frequency, which results in a higher level-of-service and a subsequent increase in passenger numbers, triggering another round of service improvements. This paper adds to the literature by presenting an analytic model for analyzing these phenomena that we call vicious and virtuous cycles. Based on field data regarding passengers' variation in willingness-to-wait for a public transport service, we investigate the dynamics of the line service and show how the emergence of a vicious or virtuous cycle depends on the total number of potential passengers, the share of captive riders, and bus capacity. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the planning of public transport services.
of transport. Among these factors, waiting time is particularly important, as riders view waiting time as much more burdensome than an equivalent amount of time spent in travel (Ceder, 2007) . Conventional wisdom holds that average waiting time equals one half of the expected headway (the time gap between two consecutive buses) (Hess et al., 2004) . While passengers can reduce their waiting time by synchronizing their arrival at a public transport stop with the service schedule, this strategy is only effective if transit service is reliable. Even in this case some waiting time will often remain, when defined as the difference between passengers' preferred departure time and the scheduled departure time provided by the service (van Reeven, 2008) . Note that this waiting time will be less visible at public transport stops, as passengers may prefer to wait at the origin of a trip (i.e., at home), hence the term 'hidden waiting time' (Furth and Muller, 2006; Basso and Jara-Diaz, 2010) .
The willingness-to-wait for a bus or other public transport service varies among passengers. This has been shown in various surveys performed over the past two decades that estimated the distribution of the maximal bus waiting time s that passengers are ready to accept in case they do not adjust their arrival to the bus stop to the bus timetable.
2 Peterson et al. (2006) , in a stated preference survey, studied how long bus users are willing to wait for a free transfer between two bus operators. They obtained that only 10% of the respondents indicated to be willing to wait for more than 15 min and only 3% for more than 20 min. Kim and Ceder (2006) asked potential passengers if they would use a planned shuttle service as depending on the time interval between buses. Half of the passengers responded that they definitely or probably accept a 5 or 10 min waiting time, while more than 70% raised doubts that they would wait for 15 min or more. In a city-wide survey conducted in Dublin, 90% of the respondents claimed that they are not willing to wait for more than 20 min, and 70% were not willing to wait for more than 10 min (Caulfield and O'Mahony, 2009) . Only 2% claimed they would be willing to wait more than 30 min.
Since stated preference studies do not necessarily accurately reflect people's revealed preferences, it is worthwhile to compare these findings with a revealed preference survey. In such a survey, Hess et al. (2004) studied the transport behavior of college students who had the choice between two identical bus lines serving the same origin-destination pair, one line served by blue buses and the other by green buses. Students could ride for free on the 'blue' bus (with the university paying for the fare on behalf of the student), but had to pay a fare of 0.75 US $ for a ride on the 'green' bus. The headway between buses on the blue line was on average 10 min; between green buses, it was 12 min. Hess et al. (2004) measured the waiting time of the students who decided to wait for a blue bus rather than board a green bus when the latter arrived first at the bus stop. They found that the average additional waiting time for these riders was 5.8 min (with an STD of 3.3 min); the median elapsed time was 4.5 min. With a headway of 10 min between the blue buses, these findings are largely in line with the conventional wisdom that actual waiting time equals, on average, one-half of the expected headway. Since virtually all students used the bus line on a regular basis, they will have had a relatively accurate estimate of the expected additional waiting time when deciding not to board an available green bus. The findings can thus be interpreted as students' actual willingness-towait for a bus. Important for the purposes of this paper, is the finding that the distribution of willingness-to-wait time is comparable to those found in stated preference studies (see below). Hence, we conclude that stated preference findings can be used for the analysis of the vicious cycle phenomenon. Fig. 1 presents the results of the two stated preference surveys of passengers' willingness-to-wait that are employed in our model. The results have been derived from the studies of Peterson et al. (2006) and Caulfield and O'Mahony (2009) . We approximate these empirical distribution densities by the function f(s) = Cs a e Àbs , with the values of parameters a and b estimated using the non-linear regression method of SPSS19 and C serving as a normalizing constant for ensuring R 30 0 f ðsÞ ¼ 1. The reaction of the passenger population to waiting time and, hence, to bus frequency, is crucial for understanding modal shift between car and bus (Kingham et al., 2001) or, more generally speaking, for understanding bus use. Hence, it is a key element in the model of the vicious cycle and in what follows we perform a deep analytical investigation of this phenomenon. We intentionally ignore other factors that influence the usage of public transport, such as accessibility of destinations, comfort of the service, car travel times, or parking availability and costs. These factors obviously will have an impact on the occurrence of vicious and virtuous cycles in a real-world setting, but do not change the fundamental dynamics of the phenomenon.
From willingness-to-wait to bus line dynamics
The model considers a circular bus line of a trip time L. Let the entire population that can be served by the line during this trip be indicated by P total , and the fraction of captive passengers among them be g, while the fraction of non-captive passengers be 1 À g, i.e. the line population consists of gP total captive passengers and of N = (1 À g)P total non-captive passengers. Captive passengers always make the trip, while non-captive passengers decide on using the bus depending on the time s they have to wait at a stop. In line with Mohring's paper and much of the literature, we assume that passengers do not adjust their arrivals to the bus stop to the timetable (van Reeven 2008) . Let us denote as N(s) the number of non-captive passengers whose maximal waiting time is between s and s + ds, that is, N ¼
NðsÞds.
2 In the remainder of the paper, we will talk about bus services rather than the general category of public transport services, as most of the studies on willingness-to-wait have been carried out for bus services. However, our model also holds for other forms of public transport, although these modes may differ in the extent to which frequencies can be adapted to changes in the level of ridership.
Let us consider the dynamics of the passengers taking the line at a daily time resolution. At a given day d, some non-captive passengers who waited for the bus that day longer than their maximal waiting time s, may decide to stop using the bus line in the future. We assume that this decision is made after several failures and, thus, the fraction of those who left at a day d is lower than the fraction of those who waited for too long that day. In parallel, we assume that some of the non-captive passengers, who currently do not use the bus, attempt to use it in the hope that the waiting time is reduced in comparison to previous experiences. Some of them may succeed to board several times in a row after waiting less than s and may thus change their mode back to the bus.
Let B(d) be the number of buses serving the line at a day d, and T B(d) = L/B(d) be the time interval between buses. Let us further assume that every passenger uses the bus once a day and that the daily ''leave line'' rate at which passengers switch from being a user to becoming a non-user is b (0 < b < 1), while the ''join line'' rate of the opposite switch is a (0 < a < 1). Users for which s > T B(d) are all served, while users with s < T B(d) are served if they arrive to the stop s minutes or less before the bus arrival. Assuming that the passengers arrive to the bus stop randomly in time, the fraction of the served users among
Let us denote the number of non-captive passengers whose maximal waiting time is s and who use the bus at a day d as PðdÞ ¼ gP total þ ð1 À gÞ
To proceed, let us assume that a bus company decides on the bus frequency once in a quarter of a year, and that the leave rate b is essentially higher than a join rate a. That is, passengers are more inclined to stop using a service if the bus does not arrive during their maximal waiting time, than to resume using the service in a hope that waiting time has decreased. Let us, for simplicity, ignore passengers with s < T B that continue to use the bus after the end of the quarter. In this case,
f ðsÞds, and the dynamics of the bus users, by quarters t, can be presented as:
where as defined above, P total is the overall number of potential passengers, g is the fraction of captive passengers among them, and t denotes a quarter of a year.
The full model, which accounts for passengers with s < T B(d) who continue to use the bus line, is presented in Appendix A, where we demonstrate that the dynamics of (3) and of the full model are qualitatively similar. For the next step of the analysis, let us denote by m the optimal number of passengers per bus that makes it maximally profitable for the operator to run the line. The value of m evidently depends on the maximal capacity of a bus, but will be somewhat lower than that to avoid overcrowded buses (and thus a risk that potential passengers will have to be left behind at a bus stop due to a lack of capacity), but higher than the number of passengers necessary to merely cover operation costs (Meignan et al., 2007) .
Let us denote as X(t) the fraction of all potential passengers using the bus line, X(t) = P(t)/Ptotal and as B(t) the number of buses needed to carry the current bus riders, B(t) = P(t)/m. Let B total be the number of buses needed to carry the total potential of passengers, B total = P total /m, and T B total be the time interval between the buses for the line served by B total buses, T B total ¼ L=B total . In this notation
Substituting T B(t) by T B total =XðtÞ, Eq. (3) is transformed into the equation of the dynamics of the fraction of bus riders by quarters of a year:
Eq. (5) represents the dynamics of a bus line's vicious cycle through the dynamics of the served fraction of the population of potential passengers.
Study of the vicious cycle
The dynamics of (5) are defined by the shape of F(X(t)) (Holmgren, 1996) ; let us investigate it as dependent on B total and g. F(X(t)) monotonously grows with the growth of X(t): F(X(t)) is an integral of a positive function and with the growth of X(t) the lower limit of the integral decreases.
Equilibriums: Equilibrium fraction of served passengers X ⁄ , if it exists, satisfies the equation
. Equilibrium X ⁄ is locally stable if |F'(X ⁄ )| < 1 and unstable if |F'(X)| > 1 (Holmgren, 1996) . For monotonously growing F(X), F'(X) is always positive and, thus, the conditions of local stability can be simplified: X ⁄ is stable if F'(X ⁄ ) < 1, and unstable, if F'(X ⁄ ) > 1. For a real-world non-monotonous distribution of the willingness-to-wait f (s), as in Fig. 1 , the possible number of equilibriums of (5) is one or three. To investigate the stability of these equilibriums, let us note that they are the points of intersection of the curve X(t + 1) = F(X(t)) and of the straight line X(t + 1) = X(t). Stability of the equilibriums is thus defined by the tangent to F(X(t)) at the point of intersection. In Fig. 3 , two qualitatively different situations are represented regarding the equilibriums of (5) as dependent on total number of potential passengers, in terms of buses B total and g.
The model dynamics for a high fraction of captive passengers (high g) is quite clear-cut. In case the total number of passengers is low, the equilibrium fraction of served passengers is only slightly above g, and the vast majority of riders are captive passengers (Fig. 3a) . This is because the bus frequency is not high enough to attract an essential fraction of non-captive passengers. Note that in case of high operating costs, no equilibrium may actually exist in this case, as the number of captive riders may be too low to warrant any public transport service. In contrast, a high number of potential passengers entails, for a high g, an initially high number of captive riders that will make it worthwhile for the operator to establish a sufficiently high bus frequency. This will attract non-captive passengers and as a result cause the development of a virtuous cycle that will ultimately result in an equilibrium fraction of riders that is close to 100% (Fig. 3b) .
The model dynamics in case of a low fraction of captive passengers (low g) depends on the total number of potential passengers in a more complex manner. When P total is low, no matter how high the initial number of buses, the operator will follow a vicious cycle and decrease bus frequency until only captive passengers will remain on the bus (Fig. 3c) . However, when the number of potential passengers is high, but the vast majority of them are not captives, the model (5) has three equilibriums (Fig. 3d) . A stable low equilibrium X Ã low % 0:21, when the frequency of buses is low and only captive passengers use the line, a stable high equilibrium X Ã high % 0:86, when the frequency of buses is high and the majority of potential passengers use the line, and an intermediate unstable equilibrium X Ã int % 0:44, separating between the domains of attraction towards the low and high equilibriums. If the initial number of buses is below X Ã int , a typical vicious cycle starts; if it is above X Ã int , the system will enter a virtuous cycle. Fig. 3 presents the process of convergence of the fraction of the bus users for four specific sets of parameters, quarter by quarter, to the equilibrium. The full bifurcation diagram (Fig. 4a) represents the dependence of the equilibrium fraction of passengers, according to (5), on the size of the population of potential passengers (in terms of B total ) and the share g of captive riders for the entire interval of B total and g. As in Fig. 3 , the diagram is constructed for the experimental distribution of willingness-to-wait of Peterson et al. (2006) presented in Fig. 1 .
The dependence of the equilibrium fraction of riders on the increasing population size is clarified in Fig. 4b and c. If the majority of the population consists of captive riders (g is high), as in a ''poor area'' with a low level of car ownership, then the bus operator will react to an increase in B total by increasing bus frequency over time, thereby also inducing more and more (5), as dependent on the total number of passengers (in terms of B total for m = 50), for the distributions f(s) of the willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006) . (a) B total = 10, g = 0.8,
non-captive passengers to change their transportation mode in favor of the bus. Given g, the higher the potential number of passengers, the closer is the equilibrium fraction of riders to 100%. This dynamics are reflected by the cross-section of the diagram for g = 0.8. For this value of g and a value of B total = 15, the equilibrium value X Ã % 0:92, while for a value of B total = 35 the equilibrium fraction of riders X Ã % 0:98 (Fig. 4b) .
In case the majority of the population consists of non-captive passengers, the dynamics of the system are more complex. These dynamics are presented by the case of g = 0.2 (Fig. 4c) . When the overall number of potential passengers is low, only one equilibrium state X Ã low is possible, in which virtually only captive passengers are served. With an increase in B total , the equilibrium bus frequency will slowly grow and, thus, the fraction of non-captive riders will slowly grow too. However, until the total number of potential riders is high enough, the growth of the equilibrium fraction of riders is, in itself, insufficient for attracting a substantial number of non-captive riders and initiating a virtuous cycle. The latter becomes possible after B total (for the values of g = 0.2 and m = 50) passes the lower threshold B 1 threshold % 22, and the number of potential riders passes mB 1 threshold % 1100, when two more equilibriums -an unstable equilibrium X Ã int and a second stable equilibrium X Ã high -emerge. For the values of B total above B 1 threshold , the public transport operator can force the line into the virtuous cycle by instantaneously raising the number of buses above the unstable equilibrium X Ã int (the dotted line in Fig. 4c ). The situation changes once again when the total population size passes, in terms of number of buses, the higher threshold B 2 threshold % 34. That is, when the total population of riders exceeds mB 2 threshold % 1700, the low stable equilibrium X Ã low and unstable equilibrium X Ã int do not exist and the only equilibrium is X Ã high . In this case, the line develops according to the virtuous cycle, and in its equilibrium serves almost all potential passengers (Fig. 4c) . Note that within the interval B 1 threshold < B total < B 2 threshold , the higher is B total , the lower is the number of additional buses that should be added by the transport operator to initiate a virtuous cycle, and the higher the value of the second equilibrium X Ã high to which the system will converge after that (Fig. 4c) . At the same time, if the increase in bus frequency is insufficient and the number of buses added by the operator would remain below X Ã int , the operator will be forced back into the vicious cycle that will return the system to the low equilibrium X Ã low . The top view (Fig. 5 ) of the 3D diagram in Fig. 4a is also helpful for understanding the bus line dynamics as dependent on the overall number of potential riders as expressed by B total and the fraction g of captive passengers. For bus capacity m = 50 passengers, the line has one equilibrium as long as the value of B total remains below B min % 17.5, i.e., as long as the total number of potential passengers remains below mB min % 875 passengers (left bottom domain in Fig. 5 ). The number of potential passengers in this case is insufficient to justify a high frequency of buses and, even if the initial bus frequency is high, it will decrease and, in an equilibrium state, the vast majority of the remaining users will be captive passengers who have no alternative means of transportation (Fig. 3c) . The equilibrium is also unique if the potential number of passengers is high and the share g of captive passengers is high, above g max % 0.43 (right top domain in Fig. 5 ). In this case, the number of captive passengers is high enough to cause a virtuous cycle irrespective of the initial frequency of buses. If the point in the (B total , g)-space that represents the total number of potential passengers and the share of captive riders is between the corners 1 and 2, then the line has one equilibrium only, in which some fraction of non-captive passengers use the bus. The closer the point to corner 2, the higher is this fraction.
The dynamics of the bus line for the parameters within the ''3 equilibriums'' domain of the (B total , g)-space is described above.
Extensions of the vicious cycle model

Bus size as a model parameter
One option for increasing bus frequency and, thus, initiating the virtuous cycle, is the use of smaller buses. Putting aside operation costs, the same total capacity of a bus line can be achieved by serving it with a higher number of smaller buses. In model terms, Eq. (4), where the size of a bus is reflected by the parameter m, is convenient for analyzing the impact of such an intervention. Just as above, if for a certain population size, the situation of one equilibrium (a line serving only captive passengers) is the only possible one (Fig. 6a) , then substitution of the line's large buses by more smaller buses, with smaller m, can turn the dynamics into a situation with two stable equilibriums (Fig. 6b ) or even one (Fig. 6c) .
The bifurcation diagram for the model (4) for P total = 1000 and varying m and g, is presented in Fig. 7 . Dependence of the line's equilibrium state(s) on B total and g. For a low B total and g (corner 1 of the parameters' space), the number of both non-captive passengers and captive passengers is low and the bus operator will be forced to decrease bus frequency and serve captive passengers only (vicious cycle). The fraction of non-captive passengers who use the line will decrease following the decrease in bus frequency. For a high B total and g (corner 2 of the parameters' space), the number of captive passengers is high enough to force the operator to increase the bus frequency and to serve both captive and noncaptive passengers (virtuous cycle). Within the ''3 equilibriums'' domain, the equilibrium state of the line depends on the initial bus frequency. To initiate a virtuous cycle, the bus operator has to start with a sufficiently high frequency that will attract non-captive passengers. Otherwise, the line will enter the vicious cycle and non-captive passengers will leave.
One or two lines?
Let us consider establishing a bus service in a new area, assuming, for simplicity, that the spatial structure of the area enables a public transport service consisting of several circular lines only, in order to serve (parts of) the population in a (5) for P total = 1000, varying m and g, and distribution of willingness-to-wait according to Peterson et al. (2006) ; (b) cross-section of the full diagram for low fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.2; and (c) cross-section of the full diagram for high fraction of captive passengers, g = 0.8. reasonable way. Then, the basic question for the public transport operator is whether it is better -i.e., more profitable -to operate only one line that serves half of the population or to establish two lines that will serve twice as much potential passengers but with only half of the total number of buses per line?
Let us apply the model of the vicious cycle for the simplest case of an area that is characterized by uniform distributions of captive and non-captive passengers. Given a number of buses B and their size m, we compare one line of length L that serves gP total captives and (1 À g)P total non-captive passengers by B buses to two non-related lines of length L, each serving P total captive riders and (1 À g)P total non-captive passengers with B/2 buses. Formally, the situation of two lines is identical to the situation of a line which length is 2L and which is served by the same number B of buses as the line of a length L.
In the first case, the interval between buses will be L/B, and the potential number of passengers P total , while in the case of two lines, the interval between buses will be 2L/B, but with a potential number of passengers of 2P total . Applying (4), the dynamics of the fraction of passengers for each case, by quarters of a year, are given by:
where X 1 (t) and X 2 (t) are the fractions of the bus riders in case of one and two lines, respectively, and B total = P total /m. As can be seen directly from (6) and (7) in case of a majority of captive passengers, i.e. g $ 1, two lines are preferable, as 2gP total passengers will be served, about twice more than in case of one line, no matter what are the other parameters of the system.
However, in case of a non-captive majority, the situation is different: until the frequency of buses 2L/B is sufficient to pass the threshold that is necessary for entering the virtuous cycle, it is worth to put all buses into one line and not to serve the second line at all. For the intermediate values of g the situation becomes more complex: depending on the population density along the line (P total /L), the number of equilibriums for one line of length L can be different from the number of equlibria of the two-line situation. We delay the study of this case to future papers.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we have presented an analytical model for analyzing the vicious and virtuous cycles in public transport based on passengers' decisions to use a public transport service dependent on waiting time. While based on an analysis of a single line and a number of simplifying assumptions -passenger do not adjust their arrivals to bus stops to the time-table; uniform distribution of captive and non-captive passengers in space and over the day; costs of transporting one additional passenger is lower than the extra revenue generated from additional ticket sales -the model shows that service provision will either enter a vicious or virtuous cycle. The dynamics of the vicious cycle converges to an equilibrium that is characterized by low service frequency and low ridership, while the dynamics of the virtuous cycle converges to an equilibrium of high service frequency and high ridership. The system's inherent parameters -total number of potential passengers (P total ), the share of non-captive passengers (g) and bus maximal capacity (m) -determine whether the system can converge to vicious or virtuous cycles. For every triple (P total , g, m), the model makes it possible to determine if vicious, virtuous or both types of cycles are possible. In case both vicious and virtuous cycles are possible, the model provides the minimal frequency that is necessary to initiate a virtuous cycle. If adequate data are available on the variations in willingness-towait among a line's potential passengers, these estimates can be exploited in reality, for estimating the minimal bus frequency that is necessary to induce a virtuous cycle.
We have analyzed the conditions of the vicious or virtuous cycle based on available field data regarding passengers' variation in willingness-to-wait for a public transport service. The analysis substantially adds to the discussion by Levinson and Krizek (2008) who used hypothetical dependencies between the frequency of buses and the number of passengers. In future work, we aim to address the issues of non-uniform distribution of passengers over space, variation in trip lengths and reliable real-time travel information provided through, e.g. smart phones.
Despite intentionally simplifying assumptions, we argue that a number of practical lessons can be drawn from the analysis of our abstract model. Let us address two situations that typify a large part of the world: city regions in wealthy countries and city regions in rapidly developing but relatively poor countries.
Typically, city regions in wealthy countries like the US, Japan, or in Western-European countries, are characterized by low shares of captive riders. Total number of potential passengers in these city regions depends highly on the urban structure. In low density sprawling areas, public transport lines, if still existent, will inevitably enter a vicious cycle if subsidies are terminated (Fig. 3a) . In denser areas, with a clustering of employment and other activities in a limited number of centers, the possible line dynamics are probably best described by Fig. 3c and both a vicious and a virtuous cycle may be possible:
Frequencies on many public transport lines will currently be below the level that separates the low and high equilibriums and so are potentially in a vicious cycle. The level of service on these lines will currently be maintained by subsidies. However, as the share of captive riders drops over time due to increasing real incomes and related car ownership, these lines will keep facing a decreasing ridership and thus subsidies will inevitably have to increase to maintain the level of service. This may not be possible due to budget limitations, forcing a decrease in service. In real-world circumstances with limited budgets, a vicious cycle therefore seems inevitable, even if the public transport service is fully regulated and heavily subsidized. Eventually, these lines will converge to a politically acceptable minimal level of service or will be terminated altogether. Some lines may actually be close to the level that separates the low and high equilibrium. For these lines, a temporary increase in subsidy combined with a requirement to increase the bus frequency may lead to a virtuous cycle. If subsidies were maintained long enough, the line, through the virtuous cycle, would converge to a high equilibrium. Note that subsidies could be reduced (substantially) at the moment the high equilibrium is reached, depending on operating costs and fare box revenues, without risking the development of a vicious cycle. This suggests that short-term increases in subsidies may actually lead to a better level-of-service and lower annual subsidies in the long run. Few lines may already be above the level that separates the low and high equilibrium, but are part of integrated subsidized tenders. In such cases, the public transport operator has no incentive to increase the level of service on these lines. It may be considered to take these lines out of the tenders and to allow operation on a commercial basis only, to trigger public transport operators to make better use of the potential offered by the virtuous cycle. Other lines may benefit from this split, both from the increase in per line subsidy and, through a network effect, from a total increase in ridership.
Recent societal changes, such as a decreasing car ownership among young adults and a leveling out of car mobility in a number of Western countries, suggest that high-density cities may actually experience an increase in the share of (voluntarily) captive passengers over the coming decade. This can be a trigger for a virtuous cycle on an increasing number of public transport lines. The experiences in Berlin, as reported by Reinhold and Kearney (2008) , show that it is indeed possible to 'engineer' a virtuous cycle for particular bus lines by increasing service frequency. However, the Berlin bus system is still heavily subsidized and service frequency is determined top-down rather than in direct response to passenger demand. It thus remains unclear whether the virtuous cycle for the main bus lines there is due to sustained subsidies or whether these lines could maintain a high equilibrium without government support.
Overall, our analysis suggests that in wealthy countries it might be attractive, both in terms of ridership and total subsidy needs, to change from area-based tenders of public transport service (Farsi et al., 2007) to a system that makes a distinction between bus lines vis-à-vis the vicious/virtuous cycle, in spite of the possible drawbacks of such a system.
Urban public transport services in the emerging economies are often in a completely different situation. They are usually characterized by a large potential passenger population and a large share of captive riders. However, several developments suggest that these cities may rapidly move into a situation in which a vicious cycle could occur. First, these cities are experiencing a rapid increase in car ownership. Second, operating costs and therefore ticket prices are likely to increase over the coming decade, due to higher demand for quality of vehicles/services and increasing labor costs. Taken together, these developments suggest a decreasing share of captive riders and a lower use of public transport among non-captive riders, which may in turn induce operators to reduce frequencies, with a risk of entering the vicious circle. The challenge for these cities will be to identify impending vicious cycles and prevent them from happening through 'early-bird' subsidies and/or strategies to reduce operating costs and increase service frequencies, such as free bus lanes and traffic light priority, in order to return to a path of a virtuous cycle. If successful, this may also reduce the rate with which the captive population will turn into a non-captive one.
A final observation regards the importance of the use of models for studying the possible development of the transportation system over time. Currently, virtually all transportation-planning agencies, whether dealing with public and/or private transport, use static and aggregate models to analyze the dynamics of real-world transport systems. The models are static in nature, in that they assume that future travel demand can be forecasted largely independently of future transport infrastructure or transport policies. The models are aggregate in that they do not simulate the behavior of the individual traveler. As such, these models are insufficient for simulating the interrelationships between the users of the transport system, the impacts of policies over time, and the intricate relation between short-and long-term dynamics of the transport system. Static aggregate transport models tend to generate results that satisfy predicted demand, but cannot identify possibilities to change the system through measures which impact becomes only apparent over time. Our study underscores that high-resolution dynamic models may substantially enrich transportation modeling and, in its wake, transportation policies. 
Andin a matrix form as:
To find the eigenvalues of matrix 1 À d d 1 À we have to solve the equation:
Let us denote (1 À d À e) as a; the roots of (3) are, thus
That is
The solution of Eq. (A2) thus converges, in days, to the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue k 1 ¼ 1. The components of this eigenvector are as follows:
That is, for given s < T B , the ratio between the number of potential passengers who use the bus and the number of potential passengers who do not use the bus, converges, in days, to Appendix B. Analysis of Levinson and Krizek's (2008) 
model
The illustrative model of the vicious cycle presented by Levinson and Krizek (2008) is based on three heuristic equations that relate between bus speed v, number of passengers P, and bus waiting time W. They do not specify in their analysis which of the equations is chosen for performing the time-step transition and we have arbitrarily chosen their second equation, as presented in (B2) below: v t ¼ 1:5 À 0:5W t ðB1Þ P tþ1 3000 ¼ e vt 1 þ e vt ðB2Þ W t ¼ 30 1 0:5 þ 0:02P t ðB3Þ Fig. A1 . Dependence of the X(t + 1) on X(t) as expressed by (A4), for the willingness-to-wait distribution found by Peterson et al. (2006) , for B total = 20, g = 0.1, and three different values of b a . The black curve represents the same dependency for the simplified model (5) that is investigated in the paper (Fig. 3c) . Fig. B1 . Equilibriums of Levinson and Krizek's (2008) model: (a) dependence of P(t + 1) on P(t) for low values of P(t) and (b) dependence of P(t + 1) on P(t) for the entire range of P(t).
To analyze the system we express P t+1 as a function of P t , substituting (B1) into (B2): P tþ1 ¼ 3000 e 
Dependency (B4) is presented in Fig. B1b , while Fig. B1a presents a zoom of the coordinate plane for the values of P t and P t+1 between 0 and 500. As can be seen, the equations of Levinson and Krizek (2008) produce, for the chosen values of parameters, three equilibriums, but result in non-realistic values of P Ã low % 0; P Ã int % 150 and P Ã high % 1; 200; 000.
